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In the mid-1950s Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 3.1 percent of global exports. By 1990 this share had fallen to 1.2 percent. Some analysts believe that external protection in OECD markets was a contributing factor. If so, the solution to Africa's problems requires liberalization of these trade barriers. Another view is that Africa's marginalization was due primarily to inappropriate domestic policies that reduced the region's ability to compete. If true, changes in Africa's own policies are required. The Development Economics Vice Presidency of the World Bank is vitally concerned with this question since the accurate identification of the factors contributing to Africa's diminished role in world trade is crucial to the formulation and implementation of corrective policy proposals.
One of the biggest challenges facing the international community today is how to eradicate the extreme rural poverty that exists in most Sub-Saharan African countries. Since increased agricultural production for export could help improve the situation of the rural poor, it is of key importance that external and domestic barriers to this activity be identified and removed. Furthermore, it is widely recognized that trade can play the role of an "engine of growth" in the industrialization process and that increased trade contacts could help Sub-Saharan African countries more fully integrate with the global economy. As such, the question of what caused Africa's marginalization in world trade is of major importance.
This book analyzes and evaluates evidence concerning the influence of external protectionism and Africa's domestic policies on the region's trade performance. By making this information available, we hope to both focus and improve policies that are aimed at removing constraints to the expansion of African exports.
Lyn Squire Acting Vice President Development Economiics and Chief Economist v Africa's Recent Export Performance
Sub-Saharan Africa's share of world trade has fallen dramatically over the past thirty or forty years.
1 UNCTAD (1993a) reports that SubSaharan Africa's share of global exports went from 3.1 percent in 1955 to 1.2 percent in 1990-a decline that implies annual trade losses of roughly $65 billion (that is, exports would have been $105 billion in 1990 instead of the actual $40 billion). Although the empirical evidence of Africa's increasing marginalization in global trade is uncontested, there is less agreement about its causes. Some policymakers have suggested that OECD protectionism has played an important role. Many development economists, however, maintain that inappropriate domestic policies greatly diminished Africa's ability to compete internationally. Since these alternative explanations have very different corrective policy implications, it is important to determine which is basically correct.
The most striking feature of Africa's performance in global trade since the early 1960s is the major erosion in the region's ability to compete in international markets. For example, in 1962-64 copper alloys were the region's single largest commodity export, with Sub-Saharan Africa supplying 32 percent of all OECD imports. By 1991-93, however, Africa's market share had dropped more than 22 percentage points to less than 10 percent. Similarly, Africa's market shares for other key commodities (such as vegetable oils, palm oil, palm nuts and kernels, and groundnuts) dropped 47-80 percentage points below earlier levels. For the thirty most important non-oil exports combined, Africa's average share declined by more than 11 percentage points (from 20.8 percent to 9.7 percent), which implies annual trade losses of about $11 billion (appendix table A.2).
2 That figure is almost equal to OECD official development assistance to Africa in 1991-$10.9 billion.
Another major adverse factor was the well below-average growth in global demand for these key commodities. From the early 1960s to the 1990s world trade in nonfuel goods increased at a compound annual rate of 11.8 percent; for African products the rate was about 4.5 percentage points lower (see appendix table A.2). Thus Africa suffered a double blow-its inappropriate domestic policies led to declining mar-ket shares for its major export products that, in turn, were of declining relative importance in world trade. This finding highlights the need for Africa to diversify out of traditional exports if the region's increased marginalization in global trade is to be reversed. There is, however, little evidence that this is happening. Indeed, exports are now more concentrated in a few products than they were thirty years ago (Ng and Yeats 1996) . Can Africa's poor export performance be attributed in any way to OECD trade barriers? Any assessment of the importance of tariffs is complicated by the widespread departure from the most-favorednation (MFN) principle in trade regimes. In recent years these departures have taken the form of regional trade preferences, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Developing countries in Africa receive one of two general preferences: those the European Union provides under the Lome Convention and those extended under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).
3 Many GSP schemes differentiate between developing countries and those that the United Nations designates as "least developed countries" (which are mostly African); even lower preferential tariffs are extended to the least developed countries. 4 The OECD tariffs faced by African countries once preferences are taken into account are shown in table 1; excluded are recently "tariffied" nontariff barriers. The table shows the average (unweighted) tariff on African exports along with the preference margin. For example, Angola faced European Union (EU) tariffs averaging 0.3 percent, 3.2 percentage points less than those on all other exporters of the same products. This margin should have enhanced Angola's ability to compete with other exporters. Similar statistics for the Republic of Korea and for Taiwan (China) are included to show the relative importance of OECD tariff barriers facing African and Asian economies. To help assess the importance of these duties as trade barriers, box 1 provides information on the level of tariffs the Asian newly industrialized economies faced-and overcame-at the start of their successful and sustained export-oriented industrialization drive.
In Europe the average tariff facing Africa typically ranges from zero to 0.3 percent, with Uganda recording a high of 0.6 percent-due mainly to a duty of 18 percent on exports of fresh grapes. The average preference margins African countries received are in the 2-4 percentage point range, reaching a high of 4.9 points for Swaziland.
5 Although margins vary, all African countries faced average tariffs below those for other exporters. For some tariff-line level products these preferential I margins were 20 percentage points or more below prevailing MFN duties. The newly industrialized economies of East Asia, by contrast, generally face unfavorable tariff margins.
Textiles and clothing played an important role in the early stages of some countries' industrialization, yet the United States failed to provide African countries (even those classified as least developed) with any preferences for these goods. As a result African exports face tariffs on some textile and clothing products that exceed 25 percent. Indeed, the average U.S. tariff is often higher than in Europe (for example, tariffs on Mauritius's exports to the United States average 6.4 percent), and the margins of preference are often lower. In some cases, as when Canada and Israel had high volumes of exports to the United States, free trade arrangements with these countries resulted in a zero tariff being applied to competitors' products, resulting in a higher than average duty for African exporters. Adverse African tariff differentials are 
OECD Regionalism and African Exports
Despite the generally favorable treatment of African exporters, there are some causes for concern. These relate to regional trade arrangements-the extent to which they have spread among OECD countries, how important they are in global trade, and how they affect African export prospects. box table) . These tariffs also incorporated a large degree of discrimination against developing countries, as reflected in the higher than average tariffs on their exports. In addition, GSP schemes had not yet been adopted, so the Asian economies had to compete with other suppliers on an equal MFN basis. Moreover, the degree of escalation in OECD tariffs was far greater than it is today (UNCTAD 1968; Yeats 1987) .
By contrast, OECD tariffs on African exports now average less than 1 percent and typically incorporate a preferential component that enhances their ability to compete with other countries. Thus Africa's poor export performance cannot be attributed to OECD tariffs.
Could it be that nontariff measures are more restrictive against African exports than they were against the East Asian economies? Evidence suggests the opposite. For example, the Short-Term Textile Arrangement was initiated in 1961 and was followed by the Long-Term Textile Arrangement in 1962. Both placed important restrictions on East Asian external tariff. Similarly, trade between EFTA and EU countries is mostly duty free under a special protocol. NAFTA provides Canada, Mexico, and the United States with duty-free access to one another's markets for most goods. Trade between Australia and New Zealand is also duty free under a free trade arrangement. The combined size of these agreements is enormous. In Europe they cover more than a third of world trade in manufactures, while all such OECD arrangements cover almost half of world trade in these goods (Braga and Yeats 1994) .
The spread of OECD regional trade arrangements has markedly altered the relative conditions of market access extended to developing countries. Specifically, a World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement on Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity, and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries makes developing coun-exports of textile and clothing products. African countries (with the exception of Mauritius and, recently, Kenya) are largely unrestricted by Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) controls on textile and clothing exports. "Voluntary" export restraints, extensively applied to East Asian exports in the 1970s and 1980s, were never applied to Africa's exports. Furthermnore, while there is evidence that agricultural protectionism has increased, it has been confined largely to temperate zone products and not been applied to the types of goods Africa exports (Laird and Yeats 1990) .
In short, the external environment for exports facing Africa today appears to be considerably more favorable than that which the East Asian economies faced and overcame. This finding suggests that internal problems are a more important cause of Africa's trade problems than are trade barriers in foreign markets. try exports to industrial countries eligible for lower duties than are similar goods from industrial nations. This treatment was extended because many developing countries often cannot compete on equal terms and need an edge to accelerate industrialization and growth. Preferences that OECD countries provide each other under regional trade arrangements, however, may alter the competitive position of African and other developing countries in a way that runs counter to the WTO agreement. At one time GSP and Lome preferences provided a competitive advantage in the products covered by these schemes, but this advantage is often neutralized by intra-OECD arrangements. Worse yet, in products not covered by the GSP or Lome, developing countries are being placed at an increasing competitive disadvantage as intra-OECD arrangements widen. The importance of this point is reflected in the fact that about half (by value) of developing countries' exports of products in MFN dutiable product lines do not receive preferences. Among these are exports of agricultural products, foodstuffs, footwear, textiles, and clothing, which are placed at a competitive disadvantage because of the high levels of MFN protection for these goods in some OECD markets.
Apart from direct trade losses, OECD arrangements have other adverse implications for Africa. Exports from Africa are often highly concentrated in a few product lines, and an important objective is to expand the export base. The problem is that the number of potentially new product lines for African countries has almost certainly been reduced by the "special and differential" treatment OECD countries provide each other. Although few attempts have been made to quantify the magnitude of these losses, the evidence suggests that they may be large and growing (World Bank 1994b).
Tariffs: The Potential for Positive OECD Policy Action
Although Africa's disappointing trade performance cannot be attributed to OECD tariffs, industrial countries could adopt initiatives that should have positive effects. These include proposals based on the Cartegena Commitment adopted at the conclusion of UNCTAD VIII. Broadly, this agreement reaffirmed industrial countries' commitment to provide "special and differential" treatment for developing countries and to incorporate further improvements in established preferences schemes. The following suggestions for OECD policy actions are in the spirit of this agreement: * Labor-intensive products such as textiles, clothing, and footwear played a key role in the early stages of the transformation of the newly industrialized economies and have a similar potential for Africa. Where these products are excluded from preference schemes (as in the United States), they should be incorporated into established schemes. * Since the exports of most African countries are concentrated in primary commodities, natural resource-based industrialization strategies could contribute to industrialization and growth. Where further commodity processing appears suitable for developing countries (that is, where labor-intensive production processes are involved), OECD preferences should be extended to processed products that now face MFN tariffs. 6 * Ceilings and quotas should be eliminated from developing country preferences, or at least be made consistent with intra-OECD preferences. Ceilings reduce the potential worth of the GSP to developing countries since, aside from their direct trade effects, they introduce considerable uncertainty (that is, exporters may not know whether a shipment will qualify for GSP treatment until its arrival in the import market). * Until these objectives are fully realized, better statistical information is needed on the constraints encountered in attempting to use preference schemes. Details are needed on the extent to which quotas are exceeded (with the result that additional exports are taxed at the prevailing MFN rate) and the extent to which exports are disqualified because of existing rules of origin. Such information is crucial for any proper assessment of the economic impact of preferences on the receiving countries and for initiatives for improving these programs.
Africa's poor export performance may not be due to OECD tariffs, but other forms of protectionism-such as quotas and restrictive licensing requirements-may have an influence. To see whether this was so, it is necessary to analyze the incidence of nontariff barriers facing Africa both before and after the Uruguay Round, which made major changes in the ability of WTO members to use such restrictions.
Pre-Uruguay Round Nontariff Barriers
What do the available data tell us about the nature and extent of industrial country nontariff barriers? The shares of OECD imports from other OECD countries, from developing countries, and from all SubSaharan African countries that encounter pre-Uruguay Round nontariff barriers are shown in table 2.7 These figures help determine whether nontariff restrictions had a discriminatory and unfavorable impact on Africa.
OECD nontariff measures affect a notably higher share of imports from developing countries than of imports from other industrial countries. About 17 percent of developing country exports (excluding petroleum) encounter nontariff barriers; the corresponding share for trade between OECD countries is about 10 percent. An even greater difference in coverage ratios exists for several product groups. About 53 percent of developing country textile exports and about 63 percent of clothing exports face restrictions. In contrast, less than 5 percent of OECD intratrade in textiles and clothing encounter nontariff restrictions. The Multifiber Arrangement, special textile quotas, bilateral quotas, and voluntary export restraints account for these major differences. 8 For some product groups the pattern is reversed, and OECD nontariff measures bear more heavily on members' exports. Some 25 percent of OECD intra-trade in foods encounters nontariff barriers, compared with 17 percent for these goods from developing countries. This is because tropical food products like tea, coffee, and cocoa (which account for about 15 percent of developing country food exports) face relatively few OECD nontariff barriers. Most nontariff 1( barriers are applied to temperate zone products (particularly grains and dairy products), which are exported mainly by other OECD countries and a few developing countries, like Argentina, outside the tropics. Sugar, which is produced in temperate zone countries (from beets) as well as in the tropics (from cane), is an exception.
The general impression from the data is that nontariff protection against African exports is less restrictive than that facing other developing countries and is about the same as that for intra-OECD trade. Only about 11 percent of African nonfuel exports face nontariff barriers, compared with 17 percent for all developing countries. Why the difference? Largely because most African countries' textile and clothing products are not affected by Multifiber Arrangement restrictions, and African exports of footwear are relatively small. One exception is Mauritius, with 88 percent of its textile and clothing exports to the United States covered by textile quotas (Kenya also recently encountered these measures). Only 19 percent of African textile exports face nontariff measures, compared with 53 percent for all developing countries, and 45 percent of Africa's clothing exports, compared with 63 percent for all developing countries. 
Achievements of the Uruguay Round
The evidence presented above establishes two main points. First, until the Uruguay Round a few African countries faced some OECD nontariff barriers, although most countries were largely unaffected. Second, these measures were applied more often against non-African developing countries. The effects of nontariff barriers, however, will change markedly as a result of the Uruguay Round and the liberalization of trade in agriculture, textiles, and clothing. Although the Round also reached agreement on the elimination of "voluntary" export restraints, these measures have not been applied to African exports.
Agriculture
After more than forty years during which agriculture was excluded from mainstream GATT rules, the Uruguay Round achieved a major breakthrough. Nontariff barriers to agricultural exports must be converted into ad valorem or specific tariffs as soon as the agreement enters into force. The resulting tariffs are to be legally bound by the World Trade Organization and reduced over six years. The conversion of nontariff barriers under the "tariffication" exercise was based on the difference between internal and extemal prices in 1986-88. The relevant calculations have been undertaken at the four-or six-digit level of the Harmonized System. Tariff equivalents for most processed products were not calculated from direct price comparisons but were computed as an average of those for the component products weighted by their share in the final good. Because of both the base year chosen for the tariffication and the manner in which the calculations were undertaken, protection could increase in the short term, but this protection should gradually decrease as a result of tariff reduction commitments (industrial countries will lower tariffs by 36 percent over six years, while developing countries will stage reductions of 24 percent over ten years). The Round also obtained commitments to reduce domestic agricultural support measures and export subsidies. These changes should increase export opportunities for African countries and, given the destabilizing effects of many nontariff barriers (Amjadi and Yeats 1995) , reduce the level of price changes in international markets for agricultural goods.
Textiles and Clothing
Discriminatory quantitative restrictions on imports of textiles and clothing have been widespread for more than thirty years, starting in 1961 with the Short-Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles. This was followed in 1962 by the Long-Term Arrangement, which lasted until 1974, when the first Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) was ratified. These arrangements have covered a growing number of products over the years and have become increasingly restrictive (Laird and Yeats 1990) .
The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing in the Uruguay Round provides for the elimination of MFA-type arrangements (that is, all nontariff barriers) over a ten-year period. This phaseout will involve the progressive elimination of quantitative restraints by product category, combined with continuing quota expansion. Restrictions must be removed from products accounting for no less than 16 percent (in terms of 1990 volumes) of items covered by the MFA as soon as the agreement enters into force.
9 There are then three more phases that take effect at the beginning of the fourth and eighth years and end of the tenth year in which an additional 17 percent, 18 percent, and 49 percent of the 1990 import volumes must be fully liberalized.
Implications for African Exports
How will the Round influence the level of nontariff protection facing Sub-Saharan Africa, and what does it mean for the competitiveness of African exports? Amjadi and Yeats (1995) computed pre-Uruguay Round nontariff barrier coverage ratios for each Sub-Saharan African country and estimated what the ratio will be after the agreement is fully implemented. To more easily assess the impact of the Round, African countries were classified into one of four groups (highly, moderately, lightly, and largely unaffected by nontariff barriers) based on their pre-Uruguay Round coverage ratios (appendix table A.1).
For some highly affected countries the projected changes in nontariff barrier coverage ratios are dramatic. Before the Uruguay Round 83 percent of Reunion's exports (mostly sugar) faced OECD restrictions. This ratio should fall to zero as a result of the agreement. The coverage ratio for Mauritius should decline by almost 60 percentage points (to just over 2 percent) after textile and clothing restrictions are lifted, while the tariffication of agricultural nontariff barriers will reduce Cape Verde's ratio from about 40 percent to zero. Overall, the share of Africa's non-oil exports that face nontariff barriers should fall from roughly 11 percent to about 3 percent. In other words, nontariff barriers had little adverse effects on African exports before the Round, and they will be even less important once the agreement is fully implemented.
For most African countries there will be only minor changes in market access conditions, due primarily to the low overall incidence of pre-Uruguay Round nontariff barriers on their exports. Countries like the Gambia, Ghana, and Mali were almost entirely unaffected by nontariff barriers before the Round, so their direct export prospects cannot be improved much-less than 0.5 percent of this "unaffected" group's exports were subject to nontariff barriers. Indeed, such countries could be hurt by more aggressive competition from exporters who were formerly restricted by the MFA or by voluntary export restraints. Even countries like R6union and Mauritius, which previously had high nontariff barrier ratios, may find themselves losing market share if they are unable to adjust to the more competitive environment that will likely follow the removal of OECD nontariff barriers. The key point, however, is that OECD nontariff barriers (as well as OECD tariffs) are not the cause of Africa's marginalization in world trade.
Appropriate OECD Policy Actions
OECD nontariff trade barriers constrain some African exports in a few sectors but are not a general problem. With few exceptions, African countries do not face MFA restrictions and are not subject to any voluntary export restraints. Similarly, in the 1980s only two OECD antidumping actions were taken against an African country (of 1,300 such cases), and in only one case was a countervailing duty applied (of 460 actions). Further evidence that nontariff protection is not responsible for Africa's poor export performance is reflected in pre-Uruguay Round nontariff barrier coverage ratios for the region's exports, which were about half those for the successful fast-growing developing country exporters in East and South Asia.
The future influence of nontariff barriers on Africa is not clear because of the Uruguay Round and the extent to which OECD members may attempt to implement other measures (like antidumping actions or safeguards) to circumvent the liberalization. There are, however, policy options that could have positive implications for Africa: * The Uruguay Round converted agricultural trade barriers into tariffs that may incorporate levels of protection of several hundred percent. Given Africa's problem of extreme rural poverty and the potential contribution that increased agricultural exports could make toward its reduction, policy initiatives are needed to reduce this protection against African food exports. One option would be to extend (ceiling-free) preferences under established GSP programs. e The Uruguay Round dramatically changed the nontariff barrier protection facing developing countries. Statistics should be updated to reflect the current (post-Uruguay Round) situation and to identify remaining nontariff barriers that are of particular importance to Africa (like those on fisheries and energy products). Moreover, monitoring mechanisms are needed to ensure that no legalized or other backsliding occurs in sectors were nontariff protection has been relaxed. * Developing country exports often have been undercut by subsidies that industrial countries employed to dispose of surpluses generated behind high levels of external protection. Although the Uruguay Round achieved some discipline in the use of such subsidies, it fell far short of the initial objectives. Analyses should be undertaken to determine where export incentives have had adverse effects on Africa and what corrective policy actions could be implemented.
* In many developing countries food security and spoilage are of major importance. Since further processing (canning, drying, freezing, packaging) generally extends the usable life of a product, any external constraints to these activities should be removed. In particular, intra-OECD preferences under regional free trade agreements have increasingly disadvantaged African export-oriented food processing industries. Measures are needed to at least place Sub-Saharan African countries on an equal competitive footing with OECD members.
Transport Costs for African Exports
Most analyses of developing country trade problems pay insufficient attention to transport costs. Although it is generally recognized that different barriers affect exports, most studies concentrate on such measures as tariffs, quotas, and other government-imposed restrictions. Some economists, however, have suggested that even small variations in international transport costs can have an important influence on the location of global production and export volumes.1 0 It is important, then, to determine whether adverse international freight costs and transport problems have contributed to the relative decline of SubSaharan Africa in global trade.
Many African countries adopted anticompetitive cargo reservation policies to foster the development of national fleets and to conserve foreign exchange. Data on national flag registrations and African balance of payments show that neither objective has been achieved. 1 1 For example, in 1990/91 Sub-Saharan Africa's net freight and insurance payments were about $3.9 billion, or roughly 15 percent of the value of the region's exports, compared with 11 percent in 1970 (appendix table A.1). Individual country statistics, however, show wide variations. Net transport and insurance payments absorbed more than 25 percent of the value of exports for a third of African countries and exceeded 70 percent for Somalia and Uganda. Net payments averaged 42 percent for the landlocked African countries-almost 25 percentage points higher than the average for other African countries. The implication is that a large share of Africa's foreign exchange earnings that might otherwise be used for productive capacity-building investments is being used to pay for international transport services. Although self-sufficiency in transportation is not an appropriate policy objective for many African countries, there is clearly a need to focus on possible cost savings in transport.
Information on nominal freight rates (the ratio of transport and insurance costs to the value of exports) can also indicate the influence of these charges on Africa's commerce. Some countries, such as the United States, compile information on international transport and insurance costs for all imports, by product and country of origin, with air and vessel shipments tabulated separately.
12 These data help provide summary statistics on 1993 transport and insurance costs-which have trade effects similar to export taxes-for Sub-Saharan exports (table 3) . Amjadi and Yeats (1995) provide further details concerning these tabulations.
Africa generally is at an important transport cost disadvantage relative to its competitors. For example, half the nominal vessel freight rates for middle-income West Africa are about 2 percentage points higher than those paid by other exporters of the same goods. To put this in perspective, the Uruguay Round achieved an average 2.4 percentage point reduction in industrial country tariffs. Moreover, in every instance there is a larger adverse margin for air freight than for vessel shipments. African air transport, at first glance, appears to be relatively less cost efficient than vessel freight.
13 Finally, the thirdquartile values indicate that some African exports encounter very high transport costs. About 25 percent of Africa's air exports have freight rates exceeding 26 percent, and a quarter of low-income West Africa's vessel shipments have nominal rates of more than 19 percent. Unlike OECD tariffs or nontariff barriers, these comparisons clearly show that international transport costs have a significant adverse impact on African exports. The structure of African transport costs also seems to have an important adverse impact on the types of goods exported. Nominal freight costs for many processed African commodities (such as cocoa powder or butter) are higher than those on the primary unprocessed component (cocoa beans). Similarly, those on processed products such as plywood and veneers are often higher than those on rough or sawn logs. One reason for this structure of freight charges is the liner (shipping) conference practice of charging what the traffic will bear. African countries have legitimate reasons for wanting to shift to exports of processed goods (greater price stability, job creation, higher export earnings, and so on), but the structure of freight costs often works against local processing of domestically produced commodities (Amjadi and Yeats 1995) .
This raises two key questions. What factors account for the adverse African transport costs, and what corrective policy measures are available? Evidence suggests that the anticompetitive cargo reservation policies adopted by most African governments have had a major adverse influence on freight costs.
14 So, the answer is clearly deregulation. World Bank studies for other regions show that deregulating and stimulating competition for shipping services may reduce freight rates in the liner trades by as much as 50 percent (Bennathan, and Panagakes 1989). This finding has far-reaching implications. African countries often have attributed their poor export performance to foreign trade barriers despite the lack of corroborating evidence.
Instead, as this analysis shows, attention should focus on the negative impact that Africa's own policies have on its export performance. Many studies show that governments and traders have far more policy options for reducing transport costs than is generally recognized (UNCTAD 1975; Yeats 1985) . These options include such measures as cargo bulking (to achieve transport economies of scale), rationalizing shipping services and improving scheduling for liners, speeding up vessel turnaround, using lower-cost tramp services (where feasible), developing or improving coastal feeder services, adopting new transport technologies, promoting shippers associations, and improving ports and storage facilities. The precise corrective measures, however, will require detailed analyses of African transport costs and systems, both by country and by region.
In the interim, some OECD policy initiatives could help ease Africa's international transport problems: * International shipping has undergone a major transformation in which procedures for cargo unitization, port operations, and related logistics have evolved into highly complex operations requiring considerable technical expertise. Since most African countries have limited access to such expertise, technical assistance programs should be expanded and extended to related activities (such as customs clearance procedures) that impinge on the efficiency of international transport operations. * Because of insufficient attention and funds, many African countries' fleets, ports, and connecting inland transport infrastructure have deteriorated or become technologically obsolete. OECD countries should sponsor a comprehensive survey of Sub-Saharan Africa's transport problems along with policy proposals for their alleviation. * The situation of landlocked African countries needs special attention given the major problems these countries face in transiting their neighbor's territories. A major effort should attempt to identify the special trade problems of the landlocked African countries and formulate policies to alleviate them.
Are Africa's Trade Policies the Problem?
Considerable evidence shows that trade policy reforms in developing countries can contribute greatly to the acceleration of industrialization and growth (Thomas and Nash 1991; World Bank 1994a) . Import restrictions often create a bias against exports that prevents local entrepreneurs from capitalizing on export opportunities, and also prevents an economy from achieving otherwise attainable growth. 15 High tariffs and nontariff barriers can also significantly raise prices for production inputs in manufacturing and greatly diminish potential exporters' ability to compete in foreign markets (Ng and Yeats 1996) . Are Africa's trade policies a factor in its marginalization in world trade? 1 6 World Bank data compiled by Ng and Yeats (1996) allow this question to be addressed.
These data are used to compare average tariffs, nominal tariffs plus all other import charges, and nontariff barrier coverage for all imports into Africa and other countries (table 4). One comparator group consists of developing countries that between 1962-64 and 1992-94 achieved compound annual non-oil export growth rates at least one percentage point greater than that for world trade. Trade of these fastgrowing exporters expanded at annual rates ranging from 12.5 percent (Papua New Guinea) to almost 25 percent (Republic of Korea)-that is, from 2.3 to 4.6 times average African growth. Do the protectionist policies of these superior export performance countries differ markedly from those of Sub-Saharan Africa?
Clearly, African trade barriers are far more restrictive than those of other countries. Tariffs average 26.8 percent-more than three times those of fast-growing exporters and more than four times the OECD average. Moreover, OECD members reduced tariffs by almost 40 percent in the Uruguay Round (to about 3.9 percent), and many fastgrowing exporters made important concessions. In contrast, Africa's trade barriers were virtually unchanged. As a result the spread between Africa's tariffs (as well as tariffs plus other import charges) and those in the other countries has widened. This disparity will further worsen Africa's ability to compete in international markets.
The use of nontariff protection has even more negative implications. More than one-third of all African imports encounter nontariff restrictions (more than 40 percent for low-income African countries)-almost nine times the average (3.9 percent) for fast-growing exporters and thirteen times the average for high-income non-OECD countries. The detrimental impact of these nontariff barriers may be considerably greater than that of tariffs. If foreign producers become increasingly efficient relative to domestic African producers, they may be able to a. Several small island countries (St. Pierre, Malta, Comoros) achieved annual export growth of more than 13 percent but were excluded from the table because their special characteristics did not provide a useful basis for comparison with other countries. China achieved annual growth of more than 20 percent but was excluded because the U.S. export ban against China greatly depressed the 1962-.64 trade base, and under its state planning system tariffs and nontariff barriers are not of paramount importance as import controls. This second point invalidates comparisons with the other countries.
erode a tariff's protective effects over time. This would increase Africans' access to lower-cost foreign products, which would improve living standards and the region's ability to compete in foreign markets.
With nontariff barriers such as quotas, however, no such beneficial adjustment is possible because the volume of goods that can be imported is subject to fixed limits. Instead of potentially narrowing differentials (as with tariffs), the gap between Africa's living standards and production efficiency will worsen relative to other countries. 
Exporting coitntry's trade barriers (utnweighted averagesfor tariffs)

Policy Implications
What caused Africa's marginalization in world trade? There is little evidence that it was government-imposed trade restrictions in OECD markets. The share of African exports subject to nontariff barriers is far lower than that of other developing countries that launched successful and sustained export-oriented industrialization drives. Moreover, tariff preferences extended under the European Union's Lome Convention and under OECD members' Generalized System of Preferences provide Africa with more favorable terms of market access than those granted to many other exporters of similar products. In contrast, international freight costs and Africa's transport policies are having a major negative impact on the region's exports. In addition, African trade barriers are far more restrictive than those in countries that achieved high export growth, and incorporate a substantial antiexport bias. If Africa is to reverse its unfavorable export trends, it must quickly adopt trade and structural adjustment policies that enhance its international competitiveness and allow African exporters to capitalize on opportunities in foreign markets. Undue delays in the adoption of such measures will further add to adjustment costs and problems. In short, the future of African economies will be determined by Africa, not by outsiders. 2. OECD trade barriers probably played a positive role for the few products in which Africa increased its market share. The 5.8 percentage point increase in raw sugar shown in appendix table A.2 was the result of increasingly restrictive European Community import controls on other suppliers while African exporters (primarily Mauritius and Reunion, which account for more than 90 percent of Sub-Saharan exports of raw sugar) had preferential market access and guaranteed market shares under the Lome Convention. In some cases, however, changes that appear to be positive actually have negative implications. For example, most exporters of tin ores developed a capacity to export processed tin products, leaving Africa as one of the few remaining suppliers of the unprocessed commodity. In other words Africa's market share increase was the result of most other countries shifting to more profitable exports of processed tin and not a real increase in Africa's competitiveness.
3. Several points should be noted concerning GSP preferences. First, some agricultural and manufactured products are exempt from their coverage, and exports of these goods encounter MFN tariffs. The exemptions are significant-about 51.6 percent of developing countries' exports of products subiect to OECD MFN duties are afforded preferences. But for various reasons (like preference ceilings or rules of origin) only about half of GSP-eligible products receive this treatment. Thus preferential terms of market access only apply to about one-quarter of developing countries' exports of goods subject to MFN duties. Second, GSP treatment can be withdrawn from specific products once predetermined ceilings are reached. Third, several economies (Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, China) have been "graduated" from GSP schemes and no longer receive preferences (it is unlikely this would happen to a country in Sub-Saharan Africa in the foreseeable future). Other developing country suppliers may also have GSP preferences withdrawn if they fail "competitive need" tests, that is, they are judged able to compete successfully with other suppliers without preferences.
4. Least developed countries in Africa are: Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, Tanzania, Zaire, and Zambia.
5. Swaziland exports mandarin and other oranges to the European Union and pays a full MFN duty of 4 percent on shipments, as it does on exports of some fresh agricultural products (including asparagus, lemons, and other citrus). These products, however, are exceptions since deep preferences are given to most other exports.
6. According to Biggs and others (1996) the originating requirements under the fourth Lome Convention are so restrictive that some African exports covered by this agreement are unable to take advantage of the preferences available. When an African exporter is unable to meet the originating requirements under Lome, the full tariff must be paid on the item (for example, a man's shirt) entering the European Union, while an exporter of the same item from (say) India or China only has to pay 85 percent of the tariff under the GSP. The GSP does not cover African exporters of these products because they are covered by Lome. Modifications to remove inconsistencies between the two EU preference systems should benefit African countries.
7. Laird and Yeats (1990, chapter 4) describe how this inventory of nontariff measures was constructed and discuss its limitations for research and policy studies. In particular, they note that trade coverage ratios are a rough approximation of the importance of nontariff barriers in that they provide no indication of the restrictiveness of the measures. Low coverage ratios, for example, could be associated with highly restrictive nontariff barriers, and vice versa. Laird and Yeats also provide extensive empirical information on the results of nontariff barriers inventory studies for industrial countries. UNCTAD (1993b, p. 37) tabulates the annual share of developing countries' exports that encountered nontariff measures over the last decade-it rose from 16.2 percent in 1981 to 18.3 percent in 1991.
8. There is ample evidence showing that textile and footwear restrictions have major trade-distorting effects on the exports of developing countries that face these measures. For example, the U.S. Intemational Trade Commission estimated tariff plus nontariff barrier protection for fifty-four broad classes of textile and clothing products. The estimates range to more than 100 percent, with the nontariff barrier component of total protection generally being far higher than that of tariffs. European levels of nontariff protection against textiles and clothing appear to be of a similar magnitude to those of the United States.
9. The agreement also establishes a transitional safeguard mechanism that allows nontariff barriers to be used in certain circumstances. These safeguards can be applied if increased import volumes cause or threaten serious damage to the domestic industry, and they can be maintained for a maximum of three years. The safeguard is invoked on a country-by-country basis but can only be applied to products that have not yet been integrated into WTO rules (that is, products on which MFA-type quotas may still be applied). A second restriction on the use of the special safeguard is that it cannot be invoked on an eligible (nonintegrated) product if that item is already subject to an MFA quota in the market concerned.
10. In a Nobel symposium on the location of international economic activity, Assar Lindbeck argued that "given other costs, firms chose between altemative international locations in order to minimize transport costs. These costs, therefore, may become low precisely because they have been highly important for location-high transport cost locations are avoided if other costs are equal." Similarly, Jagdish Bhagwati observed that "even if transport costs for any alternative location were a small proportion of total product price, they could still affect location if they varied geographically more than other costs of production" (Ohlin, Hesselborn, and Wijkman 1977, p. 276) .
11. Differences in countries' payments ratios may reflect various factors, such as differences in the types of goods exported, geographic location, landlocked status, or whether a country has a comparative advantage in shipping. However, World Bank studies indicate that national policies that severely restrict competition for transport services have a major adverse influence on freight rates (Bennathan, Escobar, and Panagakos 1989) . That African payment ratios differ significantly from other countries suggests more attention should focus on the influence of the anticompetitive cargo reservation schemes.
12. These statistics do not incorporate the cost of inland transportation-which may be high for some African countries-or port charges. The importance of port charges in Africa should not be underestimated. For example, World Bank data compiled by Tyler Biggs show port charges for clearing a twenty-foot container are $1,100 in Abidjan and $910 in Dakar. In contrast, the ocean freight cost for shipping the container to Hamburg and Le Havre ranges from $1,350-1,430.
13. There is a problem in the proper interpretation of these data since air freight shipments may go directly to interior U.S. markets and therefore avoid some inland transport costs in both the importing and exporting country Also, air freight may allow some African countries to avoid costly internal land transport if the servicing airfields are located close to the centers of production. In short, the air-vessel margin may significantly overstate the true difference in transport costs for these alternative modes of transport.
14. OECD (1992) provides an assessment of these anticompetitive practices and the current situation regarding shipping in West and Central Africa: "In 1992, West and Central African states showed no indication of liberalizing their protectionist shipping policies based largely on the unilateral interpretation of certain provisions of the UN Liner Code Convention. On the contrary there were various moves towards enacting existing, but not yet implemented restrictive policies. These attempts met with opposition by OECD member countries and their shipping lines which considered this as both protectionist and discriminatory. However, the operation of some 50 shipping lines offering regular services to West Africa from most ports of the world was not only hampered by protectionism. Civil unrest, economic depression, a sharp increase in criminal activities towards vessels together with poor port management and severe and often discriminatory customs regulations were factors shipping lines had to struggle with" (p. 43).
15. For example, Sachs and Warner (1995) find that countries with open trade policy regimes in 1971-89 had average per capita GDP growth rates 2.5 percent a year higher than countries with closed ones, and also had much greater success in shifting exports from primary commodities to manufactures. Lee (1992) demonstrates a significant inverse relation between growth and tariff rates in developing countries. World Bank (1996, chapter 2) provides extensive empirical information showing that countries with liberal trade regimes experience superior export and economic growth rates.
16. Factors other than trade policy variables have contributed to Africa's marginalization in world trade. Collier (1995) , for example, identifies political and policy uncertainty as a key factor along with a high-risk environment and a lack of serious government commitment to needed reform. Export taxes, smuggling, and false invoicing of exports also have clear negative effects on trade performance.
